Acid Rain Program - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The Acid Rain Program is a market- based initiative taken by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to reduce overall atmospheric levels of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which cause acid rain. In 2. 01. 1, the trading program that existed since 1. Cross- State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). Initially targeting only sulfur dioxide, Title IV set a decreasing cap on total SO2 emissions for each of the following several years, aiming to reduce overall emissions to 5.
Unfinished Business: Why the Acid Rain Problem Is Not Solved. Eastern Acid Rain Program in Canada and cooperative. Major problems to aquatic life from acidic rain include.
The program did not begin immediately, but was implemented in two stages: Phase I (starting January 1, 1. Phase II (starting January 1, 2. To achieve these reductions by 2. The operation and pricing of a market for emissions allowances would not be viable in the absence of an effective regulatory cap on the total number of allowances available. Scope of Phase I requirements.
This paper discusses the evolution of science and policies to control acid rain in Europe and the United States over the. Acid Rain Program: Overview, Environmental.
Each of these generating units was identified by name and location, and a quantity of emissions allowances was specified in the statute in tons of allowable SO2 emissions per year. Coal with 1. 2. 5% sulfur and 1. Btu/lb produces sulfur dioxide emissions of 2. Btu, with lower emissions produced by either lower sulfur content or higher Btu content.
This legitimized a market for sulfur dioxide emissions allowances, administered by the Chicago Board of Trade. Thereafter, they were required to obtain an emissions allowance for each ton of sulfur dioxide emitted, subject to a mandatory fine of $2,0. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) distributes allowances equivalent to 8. Btu usage for each unit, and may allocate various small . The key factors in NOx formation are flame temperature and oxygen levels present for combustion. Low- NOx burner technology was readily available, and considerably less expensive than installation of scrubbers.
Every Acid Rain Program operating permit outlines specific requirements and compliance options chosen by each source. Affected utilities also were required to install systems that continuously monitor emissions of SO2, NOx, and other related pollutants in order to track progress, ensure compliance, and provide credibility to the trading component of the program.
Monitoring data is transmitted to EPA daily via telecommunications systems. Strategies for compliance with air quality controls have been major components of electric utility planning and operations since the mid- 1.
Some observers estimated 2. Because of the time it takes to build air pollution control equipment, financial and contractual commitments to scrubbers had to be made by summer 1. Thus, decisions had to be made before price and allocation of emissions allowances were known. Consequently, most scrubber projects to meet the 1. Windfalls. The 6 inactive coal- fired units were statutory recipients of a total of 3.
Phase I sulfur dioxide emissions allowances. This marketable windfall was estimated by the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1.
Important support for this position was provided in a 1989 report of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP). Acid Rain Program Benefiting Environment, Human Health. A Federal program to reduce pollutants that cause environmentally damaging acid rain has. Since its formation in 1995, the Acid Rain Program has worked to protect. Acid deposition is a general term that includes more than simply acid rain. Acid deposition is primarily the result of emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO 2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) that can be transformed into dry.
However, actual purchases of emissions allowances in 1. In the interim, owners of one unit retired in 1. MWe Des Moines Energy Center, received $9. DOE funding for a Clean Coal Technology project to repower with a coal- fired 7.
MWe pressurized fluidized- bed combustion unit. States having the greatest number of generating units affected by the Phase I requirements were: Ohio (4. Indiana (3. 7), Pennsylvania (2. Georgia (1. 9), Tennessee (1. Kentucky (1. 7), Illinois (1. Missouri (1. 6) and West Virginia (1.
Together, Phase I units represented 2. U. S. This capacity represented about 2. U. S. In 1. 99. 5, 1. Phase I units (2. The average age of 3. Several had been on standby (e. About half (often the older units) were designed to .
For comparison, the 6 Phase I coal units retired before 1. All of the Phase I units were either built or under construction when the Clean Air Act of 1. Act was enacted. Consequently, these units were built when labor costs were significantly less than in the 1. In the 1. 99. 0s, these units were often among the least expensive of any operated by their respective owners, in terms of cost per megawatt- hour of energy produced. Compared to other plants on a utility company system, these units provided incentives for their owners to maximize operating time, minimize downtime for repairs or retrofit, and minimize further capital investments in them. Justifying large additional capital investments in plants which may have a remaining useful life of 1. Further, because large coal- fired generating units tend to reach peak operating and combustion efficiencies during the first three years of operation, declining incrementally thereafter throughout their lifetimes, these old plants were among the dirtiest sources of air pollution in the electric utility industry.
These included the future price and availability of fuels; the value of emissions allowances and operation of markets for them; the manner in which state public utilities commissions and the Internal Revenue Service would allocate the costs of scrubbing or switching fuels and the value of emissions allowances; accounting guidelines, revisions to interstate bulk power sales contracts, and possible intervention by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in interstate transfers of emissions allowances by multi- state holding companies. Changes in the competitiveness of various generating and pollution control technologies; a myriad of new rule making actions required by the Clean Air Act; and the possibility of new legislation limiting emissions of carbon dioxide, imposing a tax on carbon emissions, or on Btu usage were also of great concern. As summarized by one utility manager: . In a buyer's market, utilities renegotiated old contracts and signed new ones with a variety of provisions designed to manage risks and increase flexibility for future decisions. For example, Ohio Edison signed . Under these agreements, the utility could elect to shift purchases from high- sulfur to low- sulfur coal produced by the same supplier. The supplier retained the option of continuing to ship high- sulfur coal in lieu of low- sulfur coal if it provided sufficient emissions allowances so this coal could be burned without penalty.
In this event, the supplier paid for the allowances, and the utility paid the contract price for lower sulfur coal. Department of Energy in 1. SO2 pollution control equipment (scrubbers) on existing units would be in the $6. In December 2. 00.
Subsequently, the market price of SO2 allowances decreased to around $8. August 2. 00. 9. Participation by citizen groups. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and on the Chicago Board of Trade. EPA auctions off to the highest bidder about 2. No national environmental group has ever bid in the annual EPA Auction, but a small number of local groups have participated for many years, apparently on the theory that reducing the supply of allowances may someday drive up the price of acquiring them. For example, one of the oldest of these groups is the Acid Rain Retirement Fund (A.
R. R. F.), a non- profit, all- volunteer, community educational group. But instead of using or trading them, A. R. R. F. Because it did not exercise its right to emit any pollution during 1. That amount will increase by another 1. A. R. R. F. That's more than the annual allocation of allowances to 1. United States (some are allowed to emit almost 9.
The output from the model says that annual emissions of sulfur dioxide were reduced by 8 million tons (from 1. However, it is difficult to estimate the emissions which would have occurred without the ARP. For example, the EPA updated its analysis to reflect the effect of low- sulfur coal becoming more economical due to reduced transportation, leading the EPA to reduce its estimate of the impact of ARP by sulfur dioxide emissions by one million tons. In Phase II, emission sources drew down their banked allowances. In 2. 00. 6, emissions were again below the cap, leading to further banking.
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